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I.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Malhy Matter

The Appellant Peckham will not restate all of the facts set forth in his opening Brief, nor
will Appellant take the time to restate facts, which are unrebutted. However, Respondent's Brief
contains numerous misrepresentations of the facts or "spin" of the testimony that does not
accurately, fairly or even honestly represent the testimony of the witnesses or the evidence presented
at trial. In regard to those misrepresented facts, they are easy to identifY in Respondent's Brief since
they almost always correspond to a lack of citation to the Record.
The very first sentence of Respondent's Brief, Section C Statement of Facts, No.1 Judy
Malby Complaint, is inaccurate in that Respondent suggests that Ms. Malby's first appointment was
on February 16,2007. The testimony at trial by Ms. Malbyand the medical treatment records from
Dr. Peckham's file both corroborate that Ms. Malby's treatment began as early as 2003. (plaintiff's
Exhibit No.2) Ms. Malby had numerous treatment and consultation appointments with Dr.
Peckham prior to the 2006 and early 2007 appointments concerning tooth number 18. In those
numerous prior appointments Ms. Malby received a number of other crowns on other teeth, which
are not at issue in this matter.
At the conclusion of Respondent's Statement of Facts, Section I, still in reference to the
Malby matter, the Respondent describes the final contact between Ms. Malbyand Dr. Peckham as
suggestive that Dr. Peckham ''wrote off the remaining balance" of Ms. Malby's bill because Ms.
Malby complained as to the failure of the silver amalgam crown on tooth 18. This is not consistent
with any facts that were presented at hearing. Again, the Respondent's own exhibits introduced at
hearing are counter to the facts as set forth in their Brief.

A series of correspondence was exchanged between Ms. Malby and Dr. Peckham beginning
with an undated handwritten letter from Ms. Malby, which was responded to on April 1, 2008, by
Dr. Peckham's office and concluding with his September 10,2008, letter signed by Dr. Peckham in
which he responds by noting that he does stand behind his work, but that it is impossible for him to
stand behind work when the patient does not commit to proper dental maintenance and hygiene, a
subject that Dr. Peckham cannot address since Ms. Malby had not been into his office for more than
a year and a half at that point in time (dating back to early 2007 when the procedure was
conducted). Dr. Peckham goes on to state in his September 10, 2008, letter that Ms. Malby had
consistently refused to pay the outstanding balance along with recent allegations of
misrepresentation to the nature of the silver amalgam crown provided to her, as well as various
unrelated disputes between doctor and patient concerning insurance billing and fmancial
responsibility. Dr. Peckham concludes by noting that due to his employee's failure to timely bill
insurance, he had written off a portion of the bill (that portion the insurance should have paid) and
further that the remaining balance would be written off in recognition that the doctor-patient
relationship was obviously terminated. Although this seems a minor and perhaps unrelated point,
this is the consistent pattern of the Respondent BOD in misrepresenting, paraphrasing or, shall we
say "spinning" facts to suit their interpretation of the party's conduct.

B.

Advertising Matter

In regard to the advertising matter alleged in the Amended Complaint, the Respondent's
Brief only discusses the BOD's allegations against Dr. Peckham arising from his website, but
conveniently omits the communications that began from the BOD's executive director in 2008.
Absent that information, portions of Dr. Peckham's website would appear to be misleading,
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especially his reference to the Board's attempts to suppress his advertising. In fact, the Board
began by issuing a "cease immediately" letter to Dr. Peckham in April 2008, citing the advertising
rule, including the subsection (f) which was later stricken down by Court Order and Judgment as
unconstitutional. The April, 2008 letter from the BOD never articulates any "false, misleading or
deceptive" aspects or specifics of Dr. Peckham's advertising, but states that it may be false,
misleading or deceptive and that such representations are "intended to take advantage of the fears
and emotions of a particularly susceptible type of patient." (R. VoL I, p. 189).
Dr. Peckham provided evidence that the representations were accurate, backed up by
scientific evidence. He further asked for clarification of who/what is a "particularly susceptible type
of patient" and received no response or explanation. Receiving no evidence from the BOD that his
statements were, in fact, false, misleading or deceptive, and receiving no definition to the latter
phrase, Dr. Peckham amended his website to provide a disclaimer toward irrational people unable
to understand or make rational decisions and noted that the disclaimer was as a result of the Board's
"cease immediately" letter in 2008. It is against this backdrop that the BOD amended its complaint
to bring the advertising charges in this case.
At hearing, the BOD failed to present any evidence that the statements were in fact, false,
misleading or deceptive. The Hearing officer concluded that because Dr. Peckham, at times in the
website, refers to dentures rather than missing teeth, that it could be construed as misleading. He
further concludes that Dr. Peckham's website may mislead the public into thinking he can "cure or
limit heart disease and diabetes by dental treatment." (R. Vol. L pp. 270-272).
Finally, the hearing officer concludes that Dr. Peckham misled the public by stating on his
website that the BOD is attempting to curtail the truth by ordering him to cease the communications.

3

II.

ARGUMENT

A.

Standard of Review
[T]he standard of review for an appeal to the Court is found
in I.C. § 67-5279. The court reviews the agency record
independently of the district court's decision. First Interstate
Bank of Idaho, NA., v. West, 107 Idaho 851, 852-53, 693
P.2d 1053, 1054-55 (1984). The Court defers to the agency's
findings of fact unless those findings are clearly erroneous.
Ferguson v. Board of County Comm'rs for Ada County, 110
Idaho 785, 788, 718 P.2d 1223, 1226 (1986). The Court may
not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the
weight of evidence presented in the record. I.C. § 67 5279(1);
Woodfield v. Board of Professional Discipline, 127 Idaho
738, 744, 905 P.2d 1047,1053 (Ct.App.1995).
Pearl v. Bd. of Prof' I Discipline ofIdaho State Bd. of Med.,
137 Idaho 107, 111,44 P.3d 1162, 1166, (2002)

B.

The Malby Complaint

The Board of Dentistry persists in their argument that although their Complaint alleges that
Ms. Malby did not give informed consent in violation ofLD.A.P.A. Rules and Idaho Code, Title 54,
Chapter 9, they are not required to establish a standard of medical care in securing patient consent.
In fact, the BOD asserts that establishing a standard of care in the community is irrelevant.
Respondent's brief alleges that standard of care in the community in securing informed
consent is "irrelevant in this matter" because the BOD is disciplining Dr. Peckham under its
statutory authority found in Idaho Code § 54-924(7), (8) and (12) and LD.A.P.A. Rule
19.01.01.040.21 for failing to advise a patient in understandable terms of the treatment to be
rendered.
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In truth, the Board of Dentistry could not have state Dr. Peckham's appeal issue better than
it has on pages 9 and 10 of Respondent's Brief. The Board of Dentistry asserts that they, alone, are
the arbiter and determining body as to what does and does not constitute professional conduct in
regard to securing informed consent from a patient. The Board of Dentistry' s position is that they
are not required to establish any objective standard of professional conduct or any objective
medical, community-based standard of care when securing informed consent, as required by Idaho
law. See Sherwood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 256, 805 P.2d 452, 462 (1991); Idaho Code § 394304 (2012).

1.

Idaho law and Constitutional due process require the BOD to establish
an objective standard of care.

In Laurino v. Board of Medicine, the Board was disciplining Dr. Laurino for unprofessional
conduct. The hearing officer found that the Board's claims, with the exception of two minor
claims, were not proven. The Board independently reviewed the evidence and issued findings and
conclusions contrary to the hearing officer that Dr. Laurino violated the standard of care. On
review, the District Court reversed the Board's [mdings and conclusions. The Board of Medicine
appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. Pertinent to this issue are the [mdings of the Court in regard
to one of the many allegations, that asserted failure to properly secure informed consent.
"As to the Board's finding of a violation of the standard of care regarding a requirement
that a nurse must witness the patient's signature on a consent form prepared by the doctor, there

was no standard of care provided. Thus, these [mdings are not supported by substantial
evidence." Laurino v. Bd. of Prof I Discipline ofIdaho State Bd. of Med., 137 Idaho 596, 608,
51 P.3d 410, 422, (2002) [emphasis added].
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It would seem that the Respondent's assertion that a standard of care is "irrelevant" in this
matter is directly contrary to Idaho law. This Court clearly applied the objective standard of care
requirement to medical disciplinary proceedings in Laurino. Since no such standard was proven
by the BOD, the Court must reverse the fmdings in the Malby matter and remand with
instructions to vacate the Final Order.

2.

The BOD's discipline of Dr. Peckham without presentation of a
standard of care violates his constitutional rights.

The Idaho Supreme Court has previously found that due process requires that a
professional be given adequate notice of the allegations brought in a disciplinary proceeding and
a constitutionally definite standard of care be applied.
The Idaho Supreme Court has found professional disciplinary proceedings to be void for
vagueness "when its language does not convey sufficiently definite warnings as to the proscribed
conduct, and its language is such that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning." Wyckoffv. Board of County Commrs. of Ada County. 101 Idaho 12, 15,607 P.2d
1066, 1069 (1980) (cited in H & V Eng'g v. Board of Professional Engrs., 113 Idaho 646, 747
P.2d 55 (1987); Krueger v. Bd. of Prof1 Discipline ofIdaho State Bd. of Med., 122 Idaho 577,
580,836 P.2d 523,526, (1992)
The Respondent argues that their failure to present proof of a standard of care is irrelevant
because Dr. Peckham was accused of "unprofessional conduct" under Idaho Code § 54-924 and
IDAPA 19.01.01.040.21, "failure to advise patients ... in understandable terms of the treatment to
be rendered ... " (Respondent's Brief, pp. 9-10).
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The statutory defInition of informed patient consent is as follows:
Consent, or refusal to consent, for the furnishing of health care,
treatment or procedures shall be valid in all respects if the person
giving or refusing the consent is sufficiently aware of pertinent
facts respecting the need for, the nature of, and the signifIcant risks
ordinarily attendant upon such a person receiving such care, as to
permit the giving or withholding of such consent to be a reasonably
informed decision. Any such consent shall be deemed valid and so

informed if the health care provider to whom it is given or by
whom it is secured has made such disclosures and given such
advice respecting pertinent (Gcts and considerations as would
ordinarily be made and given under the same or similar
circumstances. by a like health care provider of good standing
practicing in the same community. As used in this section, the term
"in the same community" reters to that geographic area ordinarily
served by the licensed general hospital at or nearest to which such
consent is given.
Idaho Code § 39-4506 (2012)
[emphasis added]
The Board of Dentistry provides no explanation in Respondent's Brief for why
their defInition of informed consent is distinguishable from the statutory defInition above.
Further, the BOD argues they are not required to establish any standard for securing informed
consent. Their argument is that Ms. Malby "believed" she was receiving something other than
the Silver Amalgam Crown that Dr. Peckham advised her he could provide at lesser cost, and
that "belief' was sufficient proof of a violation, bolstered by Drs. Prosser and Bates in Spokane,
Washington, who indicated they were not familiar with the procedure. First of all, Drs. Prosser
and Bates never testifIed to a standard of care and if they had, it would not have been relevant as
both are Washington dentists.

7

"As used in this section, the tenn "in the same community" refers to that geographic area
ordinarily served by the licensed general hospital at or nearest to which such consent is given."
Idaho Code § 39-4506 (2012)
"The medical malpractice statute, I.e. § 6-1012, and the infonned consent statute, I.C. §
39-4304, both define "community" as "that geographical area ordinarily served by the licensed
general hospital at or nearest to which such care was or allegedly should have been provided."
Sherwood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 257,805 P.2d 452,463, (1991) abrogated by Verska v. Saint
Alphonsus Reg'l Med. CtI., 151 Idaho 889, 265 P.3d 502, (2011)
Neither Prosser nor Bates' opinions are relevant on this point.
The Board's member, and expert, Dr. Blaisdell, practices in Caldwell, Idaho (hundreds of
miles outside the relevant community) and provided this testimony:
Q:

In your business, in your experience, is there such a thing as
a silver crown?

A:

I'm not aware of that tenn being used. Colloquially people
would call it a silver crown. But in tenns of using that, I've
never used that they were.
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 96)

Subsequently, Counsel for the BOD attempted to ask Dr. Blaisdell if the amalgam crown
is common practice in dentistry but that testimony was excluded s by the hearing officer on
counsel's objection oflack of foundation. (TI. Vol. I, pp 97-99).
At no point in the hearing did any of the physicians called by the BOD testifY as to a
standard of care in the medical community of North Idaho when securing patient's infonned
consent to provide an amalgam crown procedure. There simply is no testimony establishing a
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standard which is why the Hearing Officer fashioned his own standard based upon Ms. Malby's
subjective "beliefs".
"It can reasonably be concluded that unless a patient is specifically informed that
amalgam will be used to create a direct placement crown, the patient did not give informed
consent." (R. VoL L, p.267)
Despite the case law and Idaho Code § 39-4506, that provide that a dentist or physician is
only required to provide that degree of information as would be given by a "like physician of
good standing" practicing in that community, the BOD has disciplined Dr. Peckham without
proof of that standard. See: Laurino v. Board of Professional Discipline of the Idaho State
Board of Medicine, 137 Idaho 596, 608, 51 P.3d 410, _

(2002); Shabinaw v. Brown, 131 Idaho

747, 751, 963 P.2d 1184, 1188 (1998).
The Board of Dentistry asserts that the case law and statutes cited by Dr. Peckham that
require establishment of an objective medical community-based standard of disclosure for informed
consent are "irrelevant to the present matter, as Dr. Peckham has only been accused of violating
portions of Idaho Code § 54-924 and portions of the Administrative Rules of the Idaho State Board
of Dentistry". (Respondent's Brief, pp.9-10) The Board of Dentistry argues that because the statute
and Administrative Rules defme unprofessional conduct as failure to comply with state statutes or
rules, unprofessional conduct does not require any proof as to the dental profession "standard"
when accused of "failure to advise patients in understandable terms of the treatment to be
rendered." (Respondent's Brief, p.lO citing LD.A.P.A. Rule 19.01.040.18 and.21) The Idaho
Board of Dentistry goes on to assert that because no standard of proof is required when prosecuting
for "unprofessional conduct" in violation of the Board's rules and statutory guidelines, it is,
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therefore, "reasonable for the hearing officer" to make his own conclusions as to that standard and
whether or not it falls below the professional conduct requirements of the statute and rule.
The BOD's Final Order purports to adopt this ephemeral "standard" created by the
Hearing Officer and that Order violated Idaho law and Dr. Peckham's constitutional rights to due
process. This Court is asked to reverse and remand with regard to the Malby matter. 1

C.

Advertising Matter

The Respondent's Brief states that Dr. Peckham "takes issue with the hearing officer's
finding that the portion of Dr. Peckham's website "The Truth about Dentures" contains
communications that were 'false, misleading, or deceptive to the public.'" (Respondent's Brief,

p.11).
In fact, Dr. Peckham appeals to this Court the District Court's Memorandum Opinion and

Order on Petition for Judicial Review ("Opinion"). The Opinion makes no mention of any of Dr.
Peckham's legal issues raised in the Petition for Judicial Review and briefmg and argument.
Specifically in regard to the advertising matter, the District Court Opinion determines that Dr.
Peckham's website violated the advertising restrictions found in IDAPA 19.01.01.046.02 (a) and
(f):
A licensee shall not advertise in any form or manner which is false,
misleading, or deceptive to the public or which is not readily
susceptible to verification. False, misleading or deceptive
advertising or advertising that is not readily susceptible to
verification includes, but is not limited to, advertising that
(a)

makes a material misrepresentation of fact or omits a
material fact; ...

Final Order failed to include the "Recommended Order" from the Hearing Officer. (R. pp.
329-333).
1 The
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(f)

makes a representation that is intended to take advantage of
the fears or emotions of a particularly susceptible type of
patient.

IDAP A 19.0l.01.046.02 (2010)
The hearing transcript makes clear at the outset that Counsel for the BOD, pursuant to the
Temporary Restraining Order entered in Peckham v. Board of Dentistry, Bonner County District
Court Case No. CV 2010- 01306, the BOD struck all references to subsection (f) in the
complaint? The hearing officer appeared to comply with the TRO, but the District Court
inexplicably cited subsection (f) in its Opinion.
Strangely, Counsel in Respondent's Brief also cites the unconstitutional subsection (f)
despite the record. (Respondent's Brief, p. 12).
The District Judge, Steve Verby entered the TRO and subsequent Final Judgment
determining subsection (f) was unconstitutionally vague and violates due process because no
definition or standard can be applied to determine when an advertising representation "is
intended to take advantage of the fears or emotions of a particularly susceptible type of patient".
It is against the backdrop of events in 2008 that this issue must be considered. On April

21,2008, the BOD's Executive Director, issued a "cease immediately" directive to Dr. Peckham
based upon its conclusion that the advertising violated subsection (a) and (f) and requesting a
response. (R.Vol. I.,pp. 189-90). Dr. Peckham responded and asked the BOD to define their
rule, specifically subsection (f) so that he could comply with the rule. Failing to receive any
definition from the BOD for the "particularly susceptible type of patient", Dr. Peckham resorted

The District Court subsequently entered in July, 2011, a Final Judgment finding subsection (f)
unconstitutional and permanently enjoining the BOD from its enforcement. This led to the BOD
proposing amendments to Rule 46 that were adopted in 2011.
2
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to inserting the "Warning" language found on the website and disclaimer that the BOD does not
want the public to know this information. (Tr.,Vol. I, pp.177-180, 225).
There is nothing false, misleading or deceptive in the websites. Nothing in the website
fails to be readily susceptible to verification.
The Respondent's Brief argues that Dr. Peckham "omitted this information [regarding
causality between missing teeth and illness found in the JADA article] in his public advertising,
obviously in the hope that the public would infer causality." (Respondent's Brief, P. 13)
In fact, the website states:
Missing teeth are associated with dementia
People with missing teeth live an average of 10 years less
than the rest of us ...
•
Long term denture use leads to bone loss and increased risk
of jaw fracture
Long term denture use may also lead to
•
•

•
•

Increasing discomfort
Increasing chewing difficulty ...

Now to be perfectly honest, we don't know exactly why all these
[acts are true .... Does the mouth cause the health problems, or
does the health cause the mouth problems?
(R. Vol. I, pp.193-4, Exhibit 18)
[emphasis added]
Contrary to the Respondent's Brief, Dr. Peckham clearly states in the website that
causality is not clear or understood. In fact he does so in plain vernacular much clearer to the
public than the Journal of American Dental Association's article.

Finally, Dr. Peckham cites

the journals and articles on the website and offers to provide more information to any member of
the public with questions.
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The Respondent's Brief argues that Dr. Peckham has falsely ascribed blame to the Board
in his website for trying to keep the information from the public. (Respondent's Brief, p. 14). As
the record clearly demonstrates, Dr. Peckham's initial publicizing of the medical studies
connecting missing teeth with various ailments was immediately met with a directive that "This
type of advertisement should cease immediately." (R. Vol. I, pp. 189-92). Unfortunately for the
duly embarrassed BOD, these are the facts. Dr. Peckham simply stated those facts on his
website, even after requesting the BOD explain their constitutionally vague and ambiguous
subsection (t). Dr. Peckham, lacking any response from the BOD to his inquiry, simply
attempted to craft disclaimer/warning language to prevent misleading the "particularly
susceptible type of patient".
Notably, the Respondent's Briefputs forth no evidence or legal precedent that supports
their prosecution of Dr. Peckham. Further, Respondent suggests that Dr. Peckham's website is
not entitled to constitutional protection of speech because it is misleading and "patently false"
but presents no explanation or specification of what statements are "false" or "misleading". The
Board argues that Dr. Peckham told the public that the Board "is not truthful" which is a
statement found nowhere in Dr. Peckham's website or material.
The website does state that the "political dental organizations don't think you can handle
the truth, and are actively trying to hide it from you." As indicated above and later in the
website, this is directly in response to the "cease immediately" letter in which the BOD alleges
that the advertising is false, misleading and deceptive and "intended to take advantage of the
fears and emotions of a particularly susceptible type of patient". (R. Vol. I, p.189).
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Dr. Peckham explains in the next paragraph that his previous dialog with the Board in an
attempt to gain a defInition to the unconstitutionally vague terminology of the Board's rule.

In fact, it took the filing of this Administrative complaint against Dr. Peckham to cause
Dr. Peckham to file suit against the BOD and cause the rule to be adjudged unconstitutional. If
not for that action, the BOD would still be enforcing its unconstitutionally vague subsection (f)
against dentists throughout the State ofIdaho. This Court must reverse and remand the BOD's
Final Order as it pertains to the advertising matter.

D.

The Final Order is statutorily deficient.

In what can only be described as a "close enough" argument, the BOD asserts that their
Final Order contains a reasoned statement in support of their decision though we have no
transcript of any deliberations and no fmdings of fact or conclusions of law found within the
Final Order. The Final Order purports to incorporate by reference and attachment the Hearing
Officer's Recommended Order, but fails to do so. The Respondent's Brief admits that no such
findings are attached or incorporated in the Final Order but ascribes that to be a "clerical error"
which this Court should overlook pursuant to Rule 60 (b), but has made no attempt to do so
through motion or otherwise. (Respondent's Brief, p. 21).
This is no small matter since the Final Order concludes by assessing fines of $5,000.00
for each violation and the BOD's attorney's fees and costs of prosecution in the sum of
$23,000.00 for a total of $33,000.00. The record contains no evidence of the Board's
deliberations and how they arrived at the fmes and costs of prosecution. The Transcript of the
Board of Dentistry's proceedings on February 11,2011, Special Meeting was requested, if
recorded, by Dr. Peckham in his Petition for Judicial Review, but no transcript has ever been
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disclosed by the Board or prepared or lodged in these proceedings. (R. Vol. I, p.338).
This Court is asked to reverse the Board of Dentistry's Final Order and remand with
instructions to vacate the findings against Dr. Peckham in both Malby and Advertising matters.
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III.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in the trial record and asserted above, this Court is respectfully

asked to reverse the Board of Dentistry's Final Order and remand with instructions to vacate the
fmdings and conclusions entered against Dr. Peckham.
Further, Dr. Peckham requests attorney's fees and costs be awarded.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9th day of October, 2012.

Attorney for Appellant
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